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ABSTRACT 
Psychopharmacology emerged with the discovery of chlorpromazine in 1952. This 
led on to the discovery of other antipsychotics, antidepressants, tranquillisers, 
psychedelics and other drugs. Traditional histories tell of a liberation of the insane 
from their asylums. This history neglects the rise and fall of antipsychiatry, and the 
fact that many more people are both employed in and treated by the mental health 
industry now than ever before. The small companies who manufactured the first 
drugs have since become the most profitable corporations on the planet, apparently 
able to mould academic debate at will and to market psychiatric disorders more 
effectively than they can make new therapeutic agents. 
In our efforts to govern ourselves through psychopharmacology, we have set up a 
future of cosmetic psychopharmacology. These developments have been largely 
unscrutinized. 
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BACKGROUND 
In 1952, the European world within 
which chlorpromazine, the first major an-
tipsychotic agent, emerged was an intensely 
hierarchical one. A world, at least within 
Europe where ethnic differences counted 
for a lot and women had litde place. A 
world that, at least as far as psychiatry was 
concerned, had little contact with the phar-
maceutical industry (Healy, 2002). 
But there were a number of things 
happening in the background that had a 
critical effect on the reception of the 
psychotropic drugs. In the course of the 
Second World War, psychiatrists associated 
with the military discovered that group 
therapies could have a dramatic impact on 
the nervous disorders produced in soldiers 
by the War. These therapies worked best 
it seemed where they were accompanied by 
a dissolution of the hierarchies of Euro-
pean social and Army life; the more infor-
mal the setting, the better (Harrison, 2000). 
North American military psychiatrists 
viewing this group therapy, in particular 
Karl Menninger, took home a message that 
psychodynamic therapy worked. This led 
North American psychiatrists returning from 
the War and also those manning the asylums 
during the War to abandon the asylums and 
to set up in office practice. The asylums 
were left to the^ Europeans, while power and 
influence in American psychiatry uniquely 
moved into the community. In so doing, 
American psychiatrists captured the vast 
range of nervous and psychosomatic com-
plaints that had previously been the prov-
ince of neurologists and internists with an 
interest in psychosomatic medicine. 
A second factor stems from a War on 
Drugs that began with the Harrison's 
Narcotics Act in 1914, which made the 
opiates and cocaine available on prescrip-
tion-only. In 1951, a Humphrey-Durham 
Amendment to the 1938 Foods Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act made the new antibiotics, 
antihypertensives, antipsychotics, antidepres-
sants, anxiolytics and other drugs, available 
on prescription-only (Healy, 1997). 
Not everybody was happy with the new 
arrangement. Many complained that a 
system designed for addicts was not appro-
priate for the citizens of a free country. A 
combustible set of ingredients had been put 
in place that in short order led to an 
explosion. By 1968, departments of psy-
chiatry from Paris to Tokyo were under 
siege. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & 
THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER 
How could chlorpromazine, which liber-
ated the insane from their straitjackets, have 
led to such an outcome? Previously, 
asylums were places, where lunatics had 
been guarded by jailers who treated them 
brutally. Transformed by chlorpromazine it 
was now possible for therapists to see the 
humanity of their patients and talk to them. 
The level of noise in the asylum had fallen 
(Swazey, 1974). But chlorpromazine also 
gave rise to an antipsychiatry and the 
antipsychiatrists responded that real strait-
jackets had simply been replaced by chemi-
cal straitjackets. They labelled the silence 
within the walls of the asylums, a silence 
of the cemetery (Postel & Allen, 1994; 
Dain, 1994). 
There was a revolution in progress that 
stemmed in great part from the new drugs 
and the interaction between these drugs and 
the social order in which people lived. The 
discovery of chlorpromazine by Delay and 
Deniker was the discovery of a drug that 
acted on a disease in order to restore a 
person to their place in the social order. But 
out of the same test tubes and laboratories, 
from which chlorpromazine came, came 
LSD and the psychedelics, Valium and the 
benzodiazepines and other drugs. These 
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were not drugs that restored people to their 
place in the social order. These were drugs 
that had the potential to transform social 
order. 
By 1968, another drug, the oral contra-
ceptive, had begun to produce just such a 
transformation of the social order by chang-
ing relations between the sexes, bringing 
with it a feminism that challenged the 
colonisation of women's minds by men. 
Nineteen sixty-eight saw the culmination 
of a project begun by Rousseau and Voltaire, 
the Enlightenment. This was a project, 
which overthrew the traditional hierarchical 
order in society. It led to the dethronement 
of kings and gods. It claimed that the 
people should be ruled by the people and 
that an individual's place in society should 
depend on merit. It claimed that individuals 
had rights in addition to duties. But this 
project had remained the preserve of white 
middle aged and middle class men. It had 
not extended to women, the young, ethnic 
groups, or others - until 1968. 
In 1968, antipsychiatrists and others 
protested against the colonisation of the 
minds of ethnic groups by white Europe-
ans, the colonisation of the minds of the 
poor by the rich, the colonisation of the 
minds of the young by the old. They 
castigated the new drugs as a means of 
controlling the young. Madness was the 
protest of the colonised (Healy, 2002). 
The anti-psychiatrists had a number of 
powerful weapons in their armoury. One 
was ECT and the other was Tardive dys-
kinesia. There is no question that ECT 
works — the problem with it and for 
psychiatry was its visibility, which led to its 
pivotal role in the movie One Flew over the 
Cuckoo's Nest. Tardive dyskinesia was a 
syndrome first described in 1960. By 1968, 
it was clear that it was a common and 
disabling side effect of antipsychotic drugs 
(Gelman, 2000). It was neither the most 
common nor the most disabling side effect, 
but it was the most visible. 
The response from psychiatry to the 
emerging recognition of tardive dyskinesia 
was the same response as from psychoana-
lysts to criticism against psychotherapy. 
When the treatment produced tardive dys-
kinesia, psychiatrists claimed it was the 
disease, in this case schizophrenia, not the 
treatment that was at fault. Similarly, 
psychiatry has blamed the disease rather 
than the drugs in the case of the SSRIs and 
suicide, and has consistently blamed the 
disease when it comes to dependence on 
therapeutic agents, most recendy in the case 
of the benzodiazepines and SSRIs. 
The visibility of tardive dyskinesia was 
an insuperable problem, however, and by 
1974, SmithKline & French had setded their 
first legal case for over $1 million. With this 
setdement, a generation of antipsychotic 
discovery came to an end. It was to be 
20 years before another generation of 
antipsychotic drugs emerged. When new 
drugs came, starting with clozapine, they 
came not because they were better than the 
older drugs but rather because clozapine 
didn't cause tardive dyskinesia. 
The combination of tardive dyskinesia 
and the ferment of the 1960s had enor-
mous effects on psychiatry. In 1957, Leo 
Hollister had run a double-blind placebo-
controlled trial of chlorpromazine in pa-
tients with tuberculosis, demonstrating that 
it produced marked physical dependence 
(Hollister, 1998). By 1966, a large number 
of studies had confirmed his observations 
diat there was a significant physical depend-
ence on antipsychotics that was present in 
large numbers of people taking them, even 
at low doses taken for a relatively short 
period of time. This led to the concept 
of therapeutic drug dependence, a concept 
that blows a hole in current theories of 
addiction. These drugs produce no toler-
ance, no euphoria, but they produce endur-
ing post-discontinuation changes that are as 
extensive and long lasting as the changes 
underpinning current disease models of 
addiction. Tardive dyskinesia was an exem-
plary instance of the kind of dependence 
the new drugs caused (Tranter & Healy, 
1998; Healy & Tranter, 1999). Given the 
widespread recognition of this syndrome, 
and therapeutic drug dependence in particu-
lar, it is extraordinary that the concept of 
therapeutic dependence on antipsychotics 
vanished in 1970, when a new War on 
Drugs was declared. 
By the end of the 1960s, psychopharma-
cology was faced with a political problem. 
The problem was how to distinguish drugs, 
which restored social order from drugs, 
which had the potential to subvert that 
order. The 'decision' was made to catego-
rise as problematic and dependence produc-
ing any drugs, which subverted the social 
order, and conversely to exempt as prob-
lem-free any psychotropic drugs which 
restored that order. This political rather 
than scientific decision set up a crisis a few 
years later when physical dependence on the 
benzodiazepines emerged. This crisis led 
to the obliteration of the anxiolytics and 
indeed almost the whole concept of 
anxiolysis. By 1990, physicians in Britain 
and elsewhere regarded benzodiazepines as 
more addictive than heroin or cocaine — 
without any scientific evidence to underpin 
this perception. 
The eclipse of the tranquillisers ga/e rise 
to an era of depression. The contrast 
between Western developments and the 
case of Japan is striking in this context. In 
Japan, there never was a crisis with the 
benzodiazepines, and the concept of an 
anxiolytic remained respectable and the 
market for anxiolytics much greater than the 
market for antidepressants. As of 2001, no 
SSRIs were available on the Japanese market 
for depression. This indicates as little else 
can how the era of Depression that we have 
lived through in the 1990s in the West has 
arguably been a politically and economically 
constructed one that bears little relationship 
to any clinical facts (Healy 1999). Never-
theless, this has been an era that has 
changed popular culture by replacing a 
psychobabble of Freudian terms with a new 
biobabble about low serotonin levels and 
the like. 
The antipsychiatric argument that mad-
ness doesn't exist is now discredited but the 
unarticulated force behind the 
antipsychiatrists' arguments was that they 
perceived that in some sense the ways in 
which we govern ourselves had changed, 
that psychiatry was now part of the new 
order of government, and that people had 
not been consulted on whether this was a 
desirable development. This development 
is caught in the redesignation of mental 
illness services as mental health services. 
Everyone agreed there had been a de-
institutionalisation. But was it a de-insti-
tutionalisation of patients? Where patients 
are concerned, in Britain at least they are 
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being detained at 3 times greater rate than 
50 years ago. They are being admitted at 
a 15 times greater rate than before, and on 
average, patients are spending a longer time 
in service beds than ever before in history. 
New conditions such as personality disor-
ders began to be admitted to mental health 
services from the 1960s and the manage-
ment of violence and social problems from 
the 1960s was becoming an issue for psy-
chiatry (Healy et al, 2001). These figures are 
more consistent with a de-institutionalisa-
tion of psychiatry and psychiatrists than 
with a return of psychiatric patients to the 
community. Unselfconsciously, psychiatrists 
claim we are treating more patients than 
ever before. We are. 
THE EMERGENCE OF 
CORPORATE PSYCHIATRY 
Antipsychiatry gave rise to the occupa-
tion of Departments of Psychiatry from 
Tokyo to Paris. The fact that nothing like 
that happens now suggests that the estab-
lishment fought back and won. There is 
however no history of the period. No 
textbooks of psychiatry record the sacking 
of the office of Jean Delay the discoverer 
of chlorpromazine. None refer to the fact 
that the key figures behind the revolutions 
of late 1960s, were psychiatrists or philoso-
phers appealing to examples from psychiatry 
— Franz Fanon, Michel Foucault, R.D. 
Laing, Thomas Szasz, Erving Goffmann, 
Herbert Marcuse. An amnesia as dense as 
this suggests a dynamic defence mechanism. 
The truth probably is that, rather than 
orthodox psychiatry winning, the world 
changed. Both psychiatry and anti-psychia-
try were swept away and replaced by a new 
corporate psychiatry. Galbraith has argued 
we no longer have free markets; corpora-
tions work out what they have to sell and 
then prepare the market so that we will want 
those products (Galbraith, 1971). This 
formula works for cars, oil, and everything 
else, why would it not work for psychiatry? 
Prescription only status for psychotropic 
drugs makes the psychiatric market easier 
than almost any other market — a com-
paratively few hearts and minds need to be 
won. 
Within psychiatry, two further factors 
have helped. One was the emergence of 
Big Science. As of the early 1970s, neu-
roscience came into play. Radiolabeled 
images of receptors began to drive drug 
development, and academic debate. The 
development of these receptor assays and 
their use to pinpoint the action of antip-
sychotic drugs on D2 receptors by Solomon 
Snyder was one of the triumphs of modern 
psychopharmacology (Creese et al, 1976; 
Snyder, 2000). This work remains as valid 
and accurate today as when it was first 
published. 
But these binding data introduce some-
thing else as well, for which neither Snyder, 
nor others who developed radiolabeled 
techniques can be held responsible. They 
introduced a new language, a language of 
Big Science, and a meeting place for phy-
sicians and companies. Where previously 
psychiatrists, antipsychiatrists and patients 
were using what was recognisably the same 
language, this no longer applied. Both sides 
had been governed by the visible presen-
tations of the patients in front of them. 
Now to get into the debate participants had 
to have a manifold filter and a scintillation 
counter. 
And as a matter of historical fact, where 
antipsychiatry was fuelled by many legiti-
mate complaints of antipsychotic side-ef-
fects, far from this new science working in 
the interests of patients and leading on to 
more sensitive treatment regimes, it led on 
to mega dose regimes. No longer answer-
able it seems to how the patients in front 
of the physician actually looked, following 
the science, prescribers moved to mega dose 
regimes of antipsychotics that may have 
caused as many brains to be injured as were 
ever injured with psychosurgery (Healy, 
2002). 
Another scientific development, which 
played a part in the development of cor-
porate psychiatry, stems from the work of 
Rene Descartes, Blaise Pascal and others, 
who, in producing statistics and probability 
theory, had helped lay the basis for the 
Enlightenment. The emergence of statistics 
was underpinned by the need of govern-
ment to raise monies (Hacking, 1975). This 
required knowledge of the people who were 
governed and their diseases. This require-
ment led in the IS* century to a mapping 
of peoples rather than just the traditional 
mapping of land that governments had 
undertaken. The new population statistics, 
allied to probability theory, gave rise to the 
insurance industry. The new population 
statistics demonstrated a differential distri-
bution of diseases and risks, and in so doing 
these figures combined to produce the 
notion of a rule of the people by the 
people, and to the creation of social science 
and epidemiology (Gigerenzer et al, 1989). 
Widiin health and psychiatry, there was an 
emergence of a moral movement. 
The same forces led by the end of 19
t
h 
century to die first attempts to map the 
human individual, their attitudes and abili-
ties, personality, or intelligence. Scales such 
as the IQ scale led to new concepts of 
norms and deviations from those norms 
and psychologists emerged to take a place 
in the educational system, the legal system, 
and in the government of ourselves — it 
was this that underpinned the psychody-
namic revolution (Rose 1989; 1998). 
This was not just the replacement of 
theology and philosophy, the qualitative 
sciences, by a new set of quantitative 
sciences. The new statistics set up a market 
in futures, a market in risks. We were on 
our way to becoming a Risk Society. In 
the case of the IQ test, deviations from the 
norm were now something that predicted 
problems in die future. Parents sought out 
psychologists in order to improve the fu-
tures for their children. In the future we 
would govern ourselves through the mar-
ketplace. 
Psychotropic drugs entered this new 
market in many different wavs. The oral 
contraceptives for instance are clearly not 
agents for the treatment of disease. They 
were a means of managing risks. Where 
once, the risks of eternal damnation had 
governed selves, the possibility of managing 
a much more immediate set of risks now 
regulated behaviour. The best selling drugs 
in modern medicine do something sirdfcr. 
Agents such as the antihypertensives and 
lipid-lowering drugs manage risks rather 
than treat disease. In the case of the 
antidepressants, these have been sold on the 
back of efforts to reduce risks of suicide. 
The key statistics in the new era are 
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clinical trial statistics, a development that 
again can be traced back to the first 
probabilists. The use of randomised clinical 
trials to evaluate new treatments has led to 
a new era popularly portrayed as an "Evi-
dence Based Medicine" era. What can go 
wrong if we have clinical trial evidence to 
demonstrate what works and what does not 
work and we adhere to this evidence? What 
more can we do than that? 
Clmkal trials in psychiatry, however, havenever 
showed that anything worked. Penicillin eradi-
cated a major psychiatric disease without 
any clinical trial to show that it worked. 
Chlorpromazine and the antidepressants were 
all discovered without clinical trials. Clinical 
trials are not needed to show haloperidol 
and other agents work for delirium. An-
aesthetics work without trials to show the 
point. Analgesics work and clinical trials 
aren't needed to show this. 
What clinical trials demonstrate are treat-
ment effects. In some cases, these effects 
are minimal. One may have to strain with 
the eye of faith to detect the treatment 
effect. The majority of trials for sertraline 
and for fluoxetine failed to detect any 
treatment effect. This is not evidence that 
sertraline or fluoxetine do not work. In 
clinical practice, there is little doubt that 
these drugs do work. The gap between 
practice and evidence points rather to the 
inadequacy of our assessment methods. 
To show that something works, we would 
need to go bevond treatment effects to 
show that these effects produce a resolution 
of the disorder in a sufficient number of 
people to outweigh the problems such as 
dependence syndromes that these drugs 
also cause. If our drugs really worked, we 
shouldn't have 3 times the number of 
patients detained now compared with be-
fore, 15 times the number of admissions 
and lengthier service bed stays for mood 
and other disorders that we have now. This 
isn't what happened in the case of a 
treatment that works, such as penicillin for 
General Paresis of Insane (GPI). 
Aside from the inadequacy of our clini-
cal trial methods, professors of psychiatry 
are now in jail for inventing patients. A 
significant proportion of the scientific lit-
erature is now ghost written. A large number 
of clinical trials done are not reported if 
the results don't suit the sponsoring com-
panies (Healy, 2001). Other trials are 
multiply reported so that anyone trying to 
meta-analyse the findings can have a real 
problem trying to work out how many trials 
there have been. Within the studies that 
are reported, data such as quality of life 
scale results on antidepressants have been 
almost uniformly suppressed. To call this 
science is misleading. Arguably, the term 
"Evidence Biased Medicine" would be more 
appropriate (Healy, 2001). 
One of the other aspects of the new 
medical arena is that the most vigorous and 
hostile patient groups of the antipsychiatry 
period have been penetrated by the phar-
maceutical industry. Other patient groups 
have been set up de novo by companies. 
Part of the market development plans for 
many drugs these days include the creation 
of patient groups to lobby on behalf of 
a new treatment. Meetings are convened 
for pharmaceutical companies specifically to 
advise and train on how to set up such 
groups. This follows a pattern found in 
other industries over the past two decades, 
where corporations have engaged their 
former critics (Stauber and Rampton, 1995) 
All of this is perhaps part of the normal 
rough and tumble between clinical practice, 
science and business. But there is a further 
even more important aspect of what is 
happening, which is contained in the fol-
lowing quote from Max Hamilton: "it may 
be that we are witnessing a change as 
revolutionary as was the introduction of 
standardization and mass production in 
manufacture. Both have their positive and 
negative sides" (Hamilton, 1972). 
Most clinicians have used the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression, but thev would 
be mystified at Hamilton's quote about a 
revolutionary aspect to using such a simple 
instrument as this. Rating Scales have been 
such feature of psychiatric trials and clinical 
practice for so long now that it is perhaps 
difficult to see that there are revolutionary 
aspects to what happened. 
linked into both the clinical trial process 
and a more general contemporary push for 
quantification, there is now a profusion of 
rating scales and checklists used throughout 
our schools and all walks of life. We 
quantify aspects of sexual behaviour, as-
pects of the behaviour of children, all sorts 
of things we never quantified before. Where 
once there was life's rich variety, now the 
quantified variation in our childrens' behav-
iour concerns us in so far as it can be shown 
to fall inside or outside all sorts of norms. 
In the case of children falling outside 
norms, clinical trial data have given parents 
the impression that there is something that 
can be done to bring their children back 
inside appropriate norms, and thereby mini-
mise the risk for their children's future. 
These data, it is widely believed, indicate 
that bv giving their children psychotropic 
drugs, parents can normalise abnormal be-
haviour. The clinical trial figures are as-
sumed, just like the figures for IQ, to be 
capable of generalisation to the population 
at large. The figures on treatment effects 
from rating scales used in our clinical trials 
have set up a new market. 
Given that we are now treating children 
from the ages of 1 to 4 with "Prozac" and 
"Ritalin", it is clear that we are not treating 
traditional diseases (Zito et al 2000). There 
is an extensive literature on how corpora-
tions make psychotropic drug markets (Healy, 
1997) but, until very recently at least, 
pharmaceutical corporations have not sold 
psychotropic drugs to children. The explo-
sion of drug use in children is arguably a 
manifestation of the force that makes 
markets, that underpins the market devel-
opment of pharmaceutical companies and 
others. This is the force that creates 
pharmaceutical companies. The treatment 
effects from clinical trials have been taken 
to be findings that generalise across the 
community - they are taken to indicate that 
these agents will return children within the 
set of norms that will minimise future risks. 
What parent could not want to minimise 
future risks for their child? 
AN ANOREXIC ANALOGY 
The eating disorders offer an analogy for 
what is involved. Clearly people have 
starved themselves for millennia — for a 
variety of reasons, good and bad. Anorexia 
nervosa, however, emerged as something 
different to previous starving behaviours in 
the early 1870s. No good epidemiological 
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figures exist for the rise in frequency of the 
syndrome, as the epidemiology of eating 
disorders didn't exist until recently, but there 
is a general perception that the syndrome 
appears to have increased in frequency in 
the 1920s and 1930s and increased yet again 
in the 1960s with new variants, such as 
bulimia nervosa, mushrooming. 
Competing theories have focused on the 
possible psychodynamics of the eating dis-
orders, the biology of anorexia or bulimia, 
or socio-political aspects of body image 
distortions. These competing theories have 
rarely spoken to each other however. Few, 
if any, accounts of these events note that 
in the 1870s weighing scales emerged and 
with them norms for weight and deviations 
from the norm and an awareness that 
deviations in the direction of what had 
formerly been thought to be healthy and 
beautiful carried risks. The insurance in-
dustry published these figures. In the 
1920s, weighing scales increased in fre-
quency and the scales, with their norms 
printed on the front of them, appeared in 
pharmacies, drug stores and other retail 
outlets. In the 1960s, the scales were 
miniaturised so that we all ended up with 
a set of scales in our homes (Schwartz, 
1986). 
Clearly weighing scales don't create eating 
disorders in that even blind individuals can 
become eating disordered. But it's impos-
sible to imagine eating disorders on the 
epidemic scale that now exist without the 
presence of both weighing scales and 
modern normative ideas about weight that 
stem from the use of these scales. And 
it is easy to imagine the removal of the 
feedback from weighing scales as being in 
many cases therapeutic in its own right 
These new figures and norms have been 
a means for women (mostly) to govern their 
bodies. But the selectivity of the figures 
also grounds a peculiarly modern neurosis. 
Just as figures for GDP give us feedback 
from some areas of endeavour but not 
others and in so doing encourage the 
promotion of automobiles and the chop-
ping down of trees, so also figures from 
this one area of life, which are easy to 
produce, have the power to control behav-
iour. Markets can be set up in other areas, 
such as air-quality and wilderness. Until 
such time as they are, it requires great 
wisdom and considerable internal resources 
to factor into our lives these other values. 
Similarly individuals with feedback from 
weighing scales can become unbalanced and 
end up in physical jeopardy as a result. 
This process affects an increasingly large 
number of areas of our lives. Some of the 
more dramatic examples come from higher 
education and health, which have been 
skewed in recent years toward the reproduc-
ible and the quantifiable. It is a problem 
that to date appears to have no solution, 
in great part because the quantifiable is so 
marketable and the alternatives are not. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & 
THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE SELF 
Under this heading three issues push for 
consideration, the future of prescription 
only arrangements, the threat to self-gov-
ernment posed by dependence on psycho-
tropic agents and the possibilities for a 
cosmetic psychopharmacology. 
A. Prescription Only Arrangements 
One aspect of the future of psychop-
harmacology is locked into the survival or 
otherwise of the system of prescription 
only medicines. This arrangement that was 
introduced for the bad drugs to restrict their 
availability, now applies exclusively to the 
good drugs. It involves a relationship of 
trust not only between physicians and their 
patients but also between physicians and 
pharmaceutical companies. One of the 
reasons to put the arrangement in place was 
that physicians would quarry information 
out of pharmaceutical companies on behalf 
of their patients and would provide a 
counter-balancing wisdom to market forces. 
Such a system is clearly out of tune with 
the Spirit of these Times. 
Since this arrangement was first put in 
place, modern pharmaceutical companies 
have grown to be among the most prof-
itable organisations on the planet. There 
has been a change from companies run by 
physicians and chemists to corporations run 
by business managers who rotate in from 
Big Oil or Big Tobacco. The pharmaceu-
tical companies are also advised by the same 
lawyers who advise Big Oil and Big Tobacco 
and other corporations. 
In the case of tobacco industry, it now 
seems clear that the legal advice in the face 
of the problems of smoking was not to 
research the hazards of smoking, as to do 
so would increase the legal liabilities of the 
corporations involved. Similar advice given 
to the managers of our pharmaceutical 
corporations would be completely incom-
patible with prescription-only arrangements. 
In fact, the lawyers who advise the phar-
maceutical corporations are the lawyers for 
the tobacco corporations. If the advice is 
comparable it would convert prescription-
only arrangements into a vehicle to deliver 
adverse medical consequences with legal 
impunity. 
Against this background, consider the 
issue of SSRIs and suicide. The following 
table is taken from a series of articles (Khan 
et al 2000; Khan et al 2001; von Keitz et 
al 1986), adjusted in the case of sertraline 
and paroxetine in the light of reviews by 
Lee (1991) and Brecher (1991) respectively: 
These figures indicate an excess of 
suicides that is statistically significant for 
certain individual agents compared to pla-
cebo, as well as significant for SSRIs as a 
group compared to placebo and also for 
these new antidepressants as a group com-
pared to placebo (Healy 2003). These 
suicide rates for SSRIs are comparable those 
found in post-marketing surveillance of the 
drugs (MacKay et al 1998), while the figures 
for placebo are comparable to findings for 
untreated depression from primary care 
(Simon and Von Korff, 1998; Boardman 
and Healy, 2001). 
There are a number of problems with 
this data. First, it was generated for the 
most part in the mid to late 1980s. Despite 
the controversy that emerged about whetner 
there may be a problem with SSRIs or not, 
in the domain of suicide induction, and 
corroborating evidence from these studies, 
there has not been a single piece of research 
carried out to answer the questions of 
whether SSRIs cause suicide or not. 
Designed yes, carried out - na 
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A second point is that many of the 
suicide attempts occurring during the wash-
out period of trials have been classified as 
placebo suicides. The washout period is a 
week long after someone has been removed 
from previous medication before they are 
randomised to investigative agent or pla-
cebo. These figures for the washout period 
have been used apparently to conceal a 
problem with new investigative agents. This 
suggests that data being collected from 
volunteers in trials is being inappropriately 
used and this inappropriate use puts all the 
rest of us in a state of legal jeopardy. 
The situation oudined here faces all of 
us with a dilemma. If these agents were 
made available over the counter, it might 
liberate medical physicians to research their 
hazards in a way that appears not to happen 
at present. There are many indicators that 
over the counter arrangements would suit 
both governments, who wish to keep their 
pharmaceutical companies happy and at die 
same time contain costs, and industry. 
Prescription only arrangements are in fact 
at present under considerable strain with the 
emergence of direct to consumer advertis-
ing for prescription only products. 
A change in the status of psychotropic 
agents from prescription only to over the 
counter would have dramatic effects on how 
we understand and govern ourselves. In 
their efforts to sell their products, industry 
have endorsed a set of categorical notions 
of mental distress, such as depression, 
social phobia, panic disorder and others. 
These would be replaced in an over the 
counter world by notions of stress, burnout 
and nerves, which would be treated by a 
range of tonics, stimulants and soothing 
agents. The moral implications of treat-
ment would be quite different. 
B. Dependence on Psychotropic 
Agents 
The figures in Table 1 above suggest a 
further problem. The suicidal acts during 
the washout week indicate that discontinu-
ing previous treatment may not be risk-free. 
Perhaps related to this risk, there are ac-
cumulating indications that antidepressants, 
and SSRI antidepressants in particular, may 
produce physical dependence. 
Dependence is the single biggest spectre 
psychotropic agents pose. This was the 
factor that led to the obliteration of the 
benzodiazepines, and the eclipse of the 
concept of a tranquilliser, with the replace-
ment of the benzodiazepine tranquillisers 
by the SSRI antidepressants. It was this 
factor that produced the Age of Depression 
that we have lived through in the West 
during the 1990s. The peculiar problem 
about dependence on drugs stems from the 
direat it poses to the government of the 
self in our current economies. 
Drug dependence is the threat that thera-
peutic establishments, government and in-
dustry find most difficult to manage. It was 
the failure in the late 1960s to manage the 
issues of dependence thrown up by the 
psychedelic drugs on the one side and 
tardive dyskinesia on the other that led to 
the bewilderment of die benzodiazepine 
crisis of the 1980s. There has never been 
a debate in public about dependence that 
has not toppled into incoherence and hys-
teria. Without a debate that concedes the 
possibility of dependence to therapeutic 
agents, however, it will impossible to dis-
tinguish between the risks of dependence 
among drugs of a uSerapeutic group and 
to advance from there to identifying what 
factors produce physical dependence. This 
dynamic means that we are probably at risk 
TABLE I: Incidence of Suicidal Acts in Antidepressant Clinical Trials 
Investigational Drug 
(SSRIs designated by *) 
Patient No  Suicides Suicide 
Attempts 
Sertraline* 
Active comparator 
Placebo 
Placebo Washout 
Paroxetine* 
Active comparator 
Placebo 
Placebo Washout 
Nefazodone 
Active comparator 
Placebo 
Mirtazapine 
Active comparator 
Placebo 
Bupropion 
Placebo 
Fluoxetine* 
Placebo 
Washout 
Citalopram* 
Placebo 
2053 
595 
786 
2963 
1151 
554 
3496 
958 
875 
2425 
977 
494 
1942 
370 
1427 
370 
4168 
691 
2 
0 
0 
0 
5 
3 
0 
2 
9 
0 
0 
8 
2 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
8 
1 
7 
1 
2 
3 
40 
12 
3 
0 
12 
6 
1 
29 
5 
3 
-
12 
0 
0 
91 
10 
of an infinite regress of "dependence cri-
ses". The next such crisis looms following 
the filing of a first class action suit for 
physical dependence on SSRIs in August 
2001. 
COSMETIC 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
With the mapping of the human ge-
nome, we have the possibilities of creating 
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new markets. We need this knowledge from 
the human genome to set up the markets 
that we need to govern ourselves. It will 
tell us about some of the underpinnings to 
our beliefs - why we believe some of the 
things we do in the religious and political 
domains. But the products of this research 
will belong almost exclusively to pharma-
ceutical corporations. If they are advised 
in the way that they appeared to be advised 
at present, this knowledge, which is so 
democratically important, will operate against 
the interests of democracy. 
In the course of the last 50 years, plastic 
surgery evolved into cosmetic surgery. Plastic 
surgery began as a set of reconstruction 
procedures aimed at restoring a person to 
their place in the social order — it was a 
treatment from the same medical universe 
as chlorpromazine. It evolved into cosmetic 
surgery when the reliability with which 
certain procedures could be carried out 
passed a certain quality threshold. Cosmetic 
surgery in contrast to plastic surgery offers 
of means of subverting the natural order 
(Haikan, 1998). 
In recent years, the word "quality" has 
been to the fore in modern healthcare, but 
quality in this context does not refer to 
good interactions between two human beings. 
Quality refers rather to the reproducibility 
of certain outcomes. Big Mac hamburgers 
are quality hamburgers in this sense — they 
are the same every time! This is an industrial 
use of the word. In the case of the 
psychotropic drugs, the quality of the 
outcomes they produce is currendy very 
low. 
The level of quality will however soon 
be transformed by the development of 
pharmacogenetics, which by predicting ad-
verse outcomes may minimise them, and by 
neuroimaging which will show whether 
treatments are working or not in a very 
immediate way. These new techniques offer 
the possibility of producing a much better 
quality of responses without the need for 
any increase in the intrinsic efficacy of 
available drugs. 
Viagra gives a good indication of what 
will happen when we get to this stage. 
Viagra is a drug that produces quality 
outcomes, in the sense of reproducible 
outcomes. When this happens, it becomes 
possible to abandon the disease concept. 
With the introduction of Viagra, pharma-
ceutical company executives and others began 
to talk openly about lifestyle agents rather 
than therapeutic agents. This is the world 
that lies in store for us. It is not the world 
of traditional medicine, where drugs treat 
diseases to restore the social order. It is 
a world in which psychopharmacological 
interventions will potentially change that 
order. The disease concept, which has 
covered for a lack of reliability in outcomes 
hitherto, will be redundant in the new 
marketplaces that will result, marketplaces 
that offer greater returns than disease-based 
healthcare does. 
CONCLUSION 
When Delay and his colleagues intro-
duced chlorpromazine in 1952 in Paris, it 
was into a different world. This was a 
universe in which Pierre Pichot and Pierre 
Deniker, the next most senior people in 
Delay's department, might be left standing 
behind Delay for an hour while he received 
a visitor. Standing at the head of depart-
ment's right hand was not experienced by 
Deniker or Pichot, however, as some exqui-
site form of torture or as a humiliation. It 
was a different time. A time when honour 
and loyalty were more important than they 
are now. These virtues counted for more 
than the search for individual authenticity 
that is so prized now. The hierarchy was 
something that these men believed in. In 
the same way, a fear of God was once seen 
as a good thing that held the social order 
in place. With Freud, this fear became 
anxiety, something to be treated, and later 
with the psychotropic agents, anxiety be-
came a set of anxiety disorders, a competi-
tive disadvantage to be overcome. 
What diis hints at is that there are forces 
at play, that can change not only the kinds 
of drugs we give, not only the conditions 
we think we are treating, but our very selves 
who are doing the giving. Forces that can 
change us as profoundly as we can be 
changed by a handful of LSD containing 
dust. 
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